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The Grand Bazaar
Inside the arched lanes of the Grand
Bazaar in Istanbul, Turkey, a tourist can find
almost any souvenir he or she desires, from aro-
matic Ceylon tea to intricately engraved camel
bone boxes. However, the most striking fea-
ture of the bazaar is not its voluminous stores
of exotic goods, but the voracious haggling
underway in each and every merchant’s booth.
Everything is negotiable; offers and counterof-
fers flow freely from the mouths of the partic-
ipants at dizzying speeds.
To an outsider, this process looks daunt-
ing and chaotic. The vendor asks outrageous
prices for his wares, while the customer waf-
fles back and forth, acting (truthfully or not)
as if the item in question is neither special
nor unique. The practice seems pointless, an all-
out battle of wits over a transaction that should
be quick and painless. However, this seem-
ingly overblown exchange is actually completely
rational and efficient. It is in the merchant’s best
interest to charge the tourist exactly what the
tourist is willing to pay, and he will attempt to
do so. In return, the customer can work as hard
as possible to buy his prized souvenir for the
lowest price the merchant is willing to accept,
even if he has to feign walking away to get it.
In the end, the item the buyer desires will be
exchanged for a price agreeable to the vendor
— both are better off from the transaction.
The logic of the Grand Bazaar is not limited
to that which is for sale within its arched walls;
it can also be applied tomany other transactions,
including the competition between two long-haul
natural gas pipelines vying to be built on Turk-
ish soil. Turkey, straddling a land bridge between
Europe and Asia, plans to rent a geopolitically
valuable strip of the Anatolian peninsula that is
in the perfect location to transport gas to West-
ern Europe without crossing traditional, but
problematic, Eastern European transit routes.
The two parties interested in Turkey’s route are
Russia and the European Union; each is look-
ing out for its own gas diversification interests
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and offering Turkey substantial but different
rewards for the use of its valuable territory.
Adding another customer to the bargain-
ing process changes the terms of the transac-
tion. Turkey is in a position of power. Instead
of two parties negotiating over the terms of a
deal advantageous to both, one customer will
undoubtedly leave Turkey’s stall empty-handed.
With a souvenir, this event may make for a
bad afternoon. But with an economic input as
vital as natural gas, losing to the other party
could result in uncertainty of gas supply for the
EU or an erosion of political leverage for the
Kremlin. Because of the undesirability of both
outcomes, the bargaining for Turkey’s route has
been protracted and heated, with each party
maneuvering to secure the best possible deal for
its constituents.
Watching the volatile process itself yields
little insight into its probable outcome; in
bargaining it is often not advantageous to be sin-
cere in one’s actions. However, it is not impos-
sible to predict with which buyer Turkey will
ultimately strike a deal. In an auction with
rapidly changing terms, some basic rules stay
static. The offer put forth by the EU differs
greatly from that of Russia. Each buyer is
offering a package of economic and political
benefits, both stated and implied. With
pipelines, there is more at stake than just tran-
sit revenues. Natural gas pipelines contain a vital
input for economic welfare that transporters are
usually able to tap into for the security and
development of their own economies. In addi-
tion, pipelines forge strong political and eco-
nomic ties between the countries building them.
Turkey must weigh the benefits and costs
of each offer, as each implies a very different
direction for the up-and-coming energy hub. In
the end, the offer Turkey chooses must coincide
with its interests as a country. In terms of the
auction, which offer is worth more to Turkey?
Weighing all monetary and political revenues
and costs, Turkish leaders will make their choice
based on whether the economic and political
benefits of each group’s offer coincide with
Turkey’s most important goals. The purpose of
this article is to compare Turkey’s options
and, based on this analysis, predict the outcome
of the competition between the two southern
bypass pipelines currently being considered, the
EU’s Nabucco and Russia’s South Stream.
Breaking the Eurasian Gas Monopoly
In order to understand Turkey’s current
situation, it is imperative to comprehend why
Russia and the EU are shopping for a bypass
in the first place. For the Nabucco pipeline,
which is backed by a consortium of private
and state-owned energy companies including
Turkey’s BOTAS¸, Austria’s OMV Gas, and Ger-
many’s RWE-AS, bypassing monopolized Russ-
ian and Ukrainian routes is the key motiva-
tion. (“Shareholders”) As shown in Figure 1, the
pipeline will directly connect consumers in
western, central, and eastern Europe with
supplier countries in central Asia, the Caucuses,
and the Middle East. Starting on the Geor-
gian-Turkish border and ending in Baumgarten,
Austria, the pipeline is expected to pump 31 bil-
lion cubic meters (bcm) of gas a year a dis-
tance of 3,300 km, and is estimated to cost 7.9
billion euros. The first phase of the project
was expected to be completed by 2012, but con-
struction has been delayed. (“Project Descrip-
tion / Pipeline Route”)
If completed, the Nabucco pipeline will
make Turkey the conduit for one-tenth of
Europe’s natural gas supply. (Lucas, p. 176)
More importantly, Nabucco’s gas would origi-
nate in a variety of countries and pass through
a pipeline that is not wholly owned and operated
by OAO Gazprom, the Russian state-owned nat-
ural gas monopoly. These two facts are impor-
tant for the EU because of the unique charac-
teristics of natural gas and its exchange on world
markets. Unlike oil, fruit, vegetables, consumer
electronics, and other goods that regularly trade
between states, natural gas is not solid or liquid
at room temperature. This seemingly innocu-
ous fact limits the options for transporting
this economic input to two: pipeline and liq-
uefaction (LNG). Due to LNG’s prohibitive costs,
pipelines are the dominant way gas is trans-
ported from supplier to consumer. (Goldman,
p. 82) Gas transport is further concentrated
because pipeline construction is a very capi-
tal-intensive activity that is subject to large
economies of scale and geographical con-
straints. Similarly, natural gas deposits are
not distributed evenly across the globe; they are
concentrated only in places that have the proper
geologic formations to capture the gas as it
forms from organic material. This concentra-
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5tion of routes and supply creates considerable
market power for the companies and coun-
tries that own them, leading to higher prices for
an input vital to economic welfare.
High prices, however, are not the only
issue downstream customers must fear. When
economic terms like supplier and transporter
are replaced with the term sovereign state, a
political component is added to the equation.
States do not always act in an economically
rational manner. Upstream monopolists can
choose to view trade simply as a means of eco-
nomic enrichment in the liberal spirit, or they
can easily adopt a more mercantilist view of
trade, whereby countries actively use the
exchange of goods to create gains in relative
political power. Russia’s gas relations with the
eastern European countries in its immediate
vicinity clearly illustrate the injection of polit-
ical ambitions into gas trade. Ukraine, a coun-
try that recently underwent a democratic rev-
olution and elected a Western-leaning
government, pays much higher prices for gas
than most of its neighbors while being under
continuous pressure from Gazprom to rene-
gotiate its gas price to the European norm.
(Chow and Elkind, pp. 82–84) Because of
Ukraine’s vital position in the trade of gas
from east to west (80 percent of Russia’s Euro-
pean deliveries are transported through it), this
pressure has led to two embargoes of gas to
Western Europe. The first was in the begin-
ning of 2006, roughly a year after the revolu-
tion. The second began on the first day of 2009
following a heated dispute over contract terms.
(“Energetic Squabbles”)
The European Union is dependent upon
this unstable transportation system for a size-
able chunk of its natural gas. Russia, endowed
with the world’s largest natural gas reserves,
currently supplies 40 percent of the EU’s energy
imports. (Quarterly Report . . . , p. 18) This
number, however, is a deceiving aggregate.
Dependency increases as one moves east across
the continent, hitting 100 percent in some cen-
tral and eastern European countries and all of
the Baltic nations. (“Country Analysis Briefs:
Russia,” p. 11) This heavy reliance, coupled with
the current rocky relationship between Russia
and Ukraine, creates a nightmare for Euro-
Figure 1
Proposed Pipeline Routes
Source: “Europe’s Energy Portal.”
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6pean decision makers trying to ensure that
the important commodity continues to flow.
In this geopolitical setting, one can see the
EU’s logic behind supporting the Nabucco
pipeline project. First, Nabucco will allow the
EU to receive gas from more transit routes
and sources and will “break up” a monopo-
lized market and turn it into an oligopoly.
This action will ultimately lead to lower prices
due to decreased market power for formerly
monopolist suppliers and transporters. In
addition to price effects, alternative routes of
travel for gas will increase the EU’s energy secu-
rity by tapping an independent alternate supply
base and transportation route, allowing the
EU to receive gas during times of supply disrup-
tion, whether they be technical or political.
Finally, by showing its cohesiveness on energy
issues, the EU will gain relative power over its
upstream partners by showing that diversifica-
tion is a viable and achievable option. This show
of unity will make Russia and Ukraine much
more likely to refrain from injecting political
ambitions into gas deals in the future, due to
the fear of further erosion of their primacy as
supplier and transporter. (Lucas, p. 176)
However, the EU will not achieve its diver-
sification goals without a challenge. Russia is
very keen to keep the status quo of dependency,
and is even trying to modify the current sys-
tem for its own advantage. It was no surprise
when Russia announced the construction of
its own southern bypass route in an attempt
to effectively kill Nabucco. This pipeline, dubbed
the South Stream, would be built by Russia’s
Gazprom and Italy’s ENI. It would transport
up to 63 bcm of Russian and Central Asian
natural gas through the Black Sea (in Turkey’s
exclusive economic zone) to Bulgaria and fur-
ther to Italy and Austria. (“Gas Pipeline Route;”
“Facts and Figures”) There are two main goals
for this pipeline: first, to bypass Ukraine and
allow Russia to use its gas for political ends
without fear of spooking the EU into a more
cohesive push toward diversification; second, to
strike first and make the Nabucco project
unprofitable, preserving the Russian monop-
oly and blocking the EU’s attempt at diversifi-
cation that does not involve Russia. (Lucas,
pp. 177–78)
Supply and Demand
In order to determine which pipeline will
ultimately be built, one must understand the
supply and demand constraints under which
these projects operate. Although the Turkish
government insists that the two pipelines are
Figure 2
Eurasian Natural Gas Trade Routes
Source: Author’s graphic based on information from Eurasia Daily Monitor.
“complementary, not rival, efforts,” the current
consensus is that there are only enough
resources and customers to support one south-
ern bypass pipeline, at least in the near
term. (“Nabucco Still the Top . . .”) Mikhail
Korchemkin of East European Gas Analysis
drove this point home in a recent analysis of
Gazprom’s pipeline volumes and the EU’s future
demand. Because the combined volume of
South and Nord Stream (Russia’s proposed
northern bypass) would be more than enough
to satisfy EU demand through 2020, he con-
cludes that Nabucco cannot even begin to be
economically feasible until 2025. (Korchemkin)
Therefore, at least in the short term, a deci-
sion for Nabucco is necessarily a decision
against South Stream and vice versa.
As illustrated in Figure 2, Nabucco’s gas
supply will come primarily from central Asia,
the Caucuses, and eventually the Middle East.
Nabucco, unlike South Stream, currently has
specific gas reserves pledged to the project from
Azerbaijan, while Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan,
Egypt, and Iraq have pledged their support in
the future. (Kardas, “Nabucco Intergovernmen-
tal Agreement . . .”) Potential Nabucco suppli-
ers have much to gain from shipping gas
through non-Russian pipelines. Currently Rus-
sia generates considerable revenues by exploit-
ing its advantageous position as one of the few
(and largest) gas transportation links between
central Asia and Europe by buying gas at low
prices in central Asia and reselling it on lucra-
tive European markets. Large gas producers
in central Asia, whose economies are geared
toward the extraction and export of gas and
oil, must accept much lower than European
prices for their precious exports. In addition, the
Kremlin has not been the most amicable trans-
porter. In April 2009, politically charged price
negotiations between Turkmenistan and Russia
ultimately led to an explosion that ripped
through the main export pipeline connecting
the two countries. (Grib) Shipments began
again in January 2010 (Socor, “Russia Resum-
ing Gas Imports . . .”), but Turkmenistan has
repeatedly shown its displeasure, severing ties
with Moscow on other deals and pledging its gas
to Nabucco. (Socor, “Turkmenistan Delays . . .”)
Nabucco offers these economically one-dimen-
sional states the very real benefit of receiving
prices closer to the European norm. In contrast,
South Stream would preserve Russia’s monop-
oly over transit routes for central Asian gas
and thus its grip on prices. It has no dedicated
supply base, but will most likely draw on the
reserves dedicated to Nabucco from Azerbai-
jan and Turkmenistan, in addition to Russian
exports currently flowing through Ukraine.
(Socor, “No Gas Sources Foreseen . . .”)
As far as demand for gas is concerned,
the main determinant of each pipeline’s success
is the European Union’s solidarity on energy
security. In the last few decades the EU has
shown remarkable unity on such issues as the
free movement of goods and capital, but it has
had a less-cohesive track record on forging a
coherent energy security policy. Russia’s usual
tactic of dealing with the EU is one of divide and
conquer, offering preferential bilateral deals to
individual EU countries that may be rational for
one but detrimental collectively. Nabucco would
undoubtedly reflect solidarity by the members
of the European Union, the culmination of a
growing realization that diversification is an
important issue for the security of Europe. Suc-
cessive Ukrainian gas crises in 2006 and 2009
and the current tumultuous contract negotia-
tions between Ukrainian and Russian leaders
have driven the point home. (Kupchinsky)
Although the individual states of the EU are still
susceptible to Russia’s divide-and-conquer
tactics, these factors combined have brought
solidarity on diversification to the forefront of
the EU’s agenda. This point was articulated by
Ferran Tarradellas Espuny, the spokesman for
energy of the European Commission, in a recent
interview with the respected Russian business
daily Kommersant, where he explained explic-
itly that “South Stream is not a priority, for
the EU Nabucco is much more important.”
(Gabuev)
Turkey’s Choice
Supply is ample enough for one South-
ern bypass. The European Union has diversifi-
cation on the agenda. What matters now is forg-
ing a specific political and territorial connection
between the two ends of the hypothetical
pipeline. Thus Turkey, or more specifically its
geopolitically valuable land corridor, becomes
the linchpin — the most important link in
the EU’s (and Russia’s) prospective gas transit
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8route. (Lucas, p. 176) As would be expected from
the vendor of any highly-sought-after item,
Turkey is currently playing both projects’ pro-
ponents against each other in the hopes of driv-
ing up the price for its valuable property. Both
projects are moving along without any regard
to the technical and economic constraints the
pipelines face in being built. In the near term,
there can be only one.
The Nabucco intergovernmental agree-
ment, a 50-year legal framework that will
become the base for future negotiations, was
signed in Ankara on July 13, 2009. The partic-
ipants in the event indicate its importance:
the prime ministers of Austria, Bulgaria, Hun-
gary, Iraq, Romania, and Turkey attended, along
with the President of Georgia (Mikheil
Saakashvili), the EU Commission’s President
(Jose Manuel Barroso), the EU Energy Commis-
sioner (Adris Pielbags), and the U.S. special
envoy for Eurasian energy (Richard Morn-
ingstar). The high-level participants agreed on
a framework for signing future project agree-
ments (five in all over the next five years) with
the ultimate goal of completing the construc-
tion of the delayed pipeline by 2014. The Azeris
reaffirmed their pledge to supply gas to the proj-
ect, and the Iraqi Prime Minister announced
that 17 bcm would be available for Nabucco
by 2017. Financing was discussed, and the
expectation is that it will be secured shortly.
(Kardas, “Nabucco Intergovernmental . . .”)
This successful meeting prompted the
Russian newspaper Kommersant to run an arti-
cle proclaiming “Nabucco is inevitable.” (Zygar’)
However, the euphoria did not last long for
the Nabucco partners. On August 6, 2009,
Turkey signed a less potent, non-binding agree-
ment pledging its support for the South Stream
pipeline. The proposed pipeline grew in size
from its last conception, dwarfing Nabucco at
63 bcm a year of gas throughput, although once
again no gas has been specifically earmarked
to run through the enlarged pipeline.1 Cost esti-
mates for the pipeline’s construction were given
but seem artificially low, especially since secur-
ing financing for the project will not be an
easy task. Russia was deeply affected by the
global economic downturn, and government
revenues are low. The meeting had one impor-
tant outcome: it finalized South Stream’s posi-
tion as a direct competitor to Nabucco by put-
ting into writing a previously informal agreement
for the pipeline to run through Turkey’s exclu-
sive economic zone. (Socor, “Putin Entices . . .”)
The partners also agreed to order seismic and sur-
vey analysis for the proposed route. The Turk-
ish government authorized the studies to com-
mence in a meeting in Milan on October 19,
2009. (Socor, “Samsun-Ceyhan Pipeline . . .”)
Comparing the meetings concerning the
two pipelines, it is very clear that South Stream
is not as far along as the Nabucco project.
Concrete cost estimates, financing pledges, and
set-aside gas make Nabucco the clear front-
runner at this point. However, South Stream
is still a viable alternative if Nabucco were to fall
through. And just because one project is ahead
of the other in the preliminary stages of plan-
ning, it does not mean it will move from the
drawing board to construction. It is definitely
in Turkey’s interest to use all possible tactics
to make it seem as if both Russia and the EU are
viable partners, even though only one deal can
be struck. For this reason, examining the rhet-
oric of the international meetings yields little
insight into which pipeline will actually be con-
structed. But there is a better option. While
all the parties continue to maneuver, two things
remain concrete: Turkey’s strategic interests and
the broad implications of the two different
offers. Identifying the offer that coincides
most completely with Turkey’s interests will sep-
arate bluffs and other false maneuverings from
the most likely outcome of the competition.
Many important interests will affect
Turkey’s ultimate decision, which could be the
determining factor in the Nabucco-South
Stream competition if the EU can get its act
together. The country no doubt sees the strate-
gic advantage of becoming an energy trans-
portation hub during a time of constrained
world supply. The most superficial of the ben-
efits of being an energy transporter is monetary
gain from pipeline transportation fees. Under
the Nabucco project, the payment will be based
on the distance the pipe travels over a respec-
tive country’s territory. Turkey, the largest land-
mass over which the pipe travels, will receive 60
percent of transportation revenues, totaling
1
The pipe’s planned volumes were previously 31
(the same as Nabucco’s) and 47 bcm respectively. (Socor,
“No Gas Sources . . .”)
450 million euros a year, along with funds for
infrastructure development. (Kardas, “Nabucco
Intergovernmental . . .”) South Stream, on
the other hand, currently has no set framework
for the determination of transit revenues. The
Russians are tough and sometimes belligerent
bargainers, as illustrated by the contract nego-
tiations between Russia and its pesky transit
country neighbor Ukraine. The transparent,
easy-to-understand tariff formula offered by the
EU is a major departure from the current Russ-
ian norm.
Although tariff revenues are important,
the security of Turkey’s energy supply definitely
trumps short-term economic gain as a factor in
deciding which buyer’s bid to choose. Turkey’s
gas supply is extremely insecure — the com-
modity accounts for 29 percent of the country’s
energy consumption, and the country is highly
dependent on imports, the majority of which
(almost 70 percent) come from Russia. (“Coun-
try Analysis Briefs: Turkey,” p. 1; “Putin Signs
Energy . . .”) As Figure 3 shows, the gap between
production and consumption will only continue
to widen as Turkey’s young population grows
and its economy continues to develop. Thus,
it is imperative for Turkey to ensure that its
gas supply continues to flow uninterrupted.
With this knowledge in mind, it is under-
standable that the biggest issue for Turkey is the
amount of gas it is allowed to withdraw from the
pipeline for its own use. The current framework
of the Nabucco Consortium states that 50 per-
cent of the pipeline’s gas is to be reserved for its
shareholders while the other half will be auc-
tioned to outside companies. (Kardas, “Nabucco
Intergovernmental . . .”) The Turkish govern-
ment pushed hard to be able to take 15 per-
cent of the amount allotted to the partners. This
issue was a major sticking point in the bar-
gaining process — Turkey’s BOTAS¸ claimed
the 15 percent “take away” was still being nego-
tiated, while EU officials continuously con-
tended the amount was too large and off the
table. (Kardas, “Turkish-Azeri Talks . . .”) The
very public disagreement seems to be over.
Turkey’s Secretary of State for Energy Taner
Yildiz recently suggested that Turkey obtained
other security guarantees, like the ability to bid
for the surplus gas and the construction of a
multidirectional pipeline to ship excess gas from
Europe back to Turkey.2 (Kardas, “Nabucco
Intergovernmental . . .”) In comparison, South
Stream again offers Turkey little in the way of
9
Figure 3
Turkey’s Gas Imports
Source: “Country Analysis Briefs: Turkey,” p. 5.
2In times of gas surplus in the EU, which are com-
mon because long-term deals rarely correctly estimate
the exact amount of gas needed by a country, Turkey
would be able to buy the excess gas by shipping it in the
reverse direction from the EU to Turkey. Most pipelines only
flow one way, making this transaction impossible.
concrete benefits. Turkey is not part of the joint-
stock company, and thus there is no obliga-
tion for the partners to allow Turkey to receive
any gas at all. As in the case of the transporta-
tion fees, the details must be sorted out later,
once South Stream is further along in its devel-
opment and the Turks have committed them-
selves to working with Russia. (Socor, “Putin
Entices . . .”)
In its quest to become an international
energy hub, Turkey’s interests transcend those
of money and security. Completing the Nabucco
pipeline to bypass monopolized Russian routes
is a preeminent goal of the European Union, a
club that Turkey has been attempting to join
since October 2005.3 The Nabucco project high-
lights the EU’s strategic need to include Turkey
to achieve vital energy security goals. (Tekin and
Williams, pp. 350–52) The EU was created to
achieve goals that could not be attained by indi-
vidual states acting alone. By this line of reason-
ing, Turkey’s inclusion into the Union is a
rational next step in the EU’s evolution. The
Turks’ accession will ensure that Europe has a
safe and secure conduit to receive diversified gas
shipments, breaking Russia’s hold over the EU’s
energy imports. The joint statement released
from the “Turkey and the EU: Together for a
European Energy Policy” conference in Istan-
bul on June 5, 2007, echoes this reasoning, stat-
ing explicitly that “Turkey is of strategic impor-
tance for the security of energy supplies to the
EU.” (Joint Conference Statement) On top of
forging shared interests, the process of integrat-
ing its energy markets with the EU will
undoubtedly bring the EU and Turkey closer
together physically — investments must be
coordinated and bureaucratic infrastructure
must be standardized. (Tekin and Williams,
p. 352) In contrast, the South Stream pipeline
will undeniably create more connections
between Russia and Turkey. Russia, with its own
development troubles, has little to offer in
regard to bureaucratic reform or high tech
investment. Indeed, the current push in the
country is to combat corruption in the gov-
ernment and develop a more diversified econ-
omy. (Medvedev)
The Highest Bidder
It is clear that Turkey has nothing to lose
from driving a hard bargain for its geopolitically
valuable gas transportation corridor. Both bid-
ders have a great desire to secure the route for
their respective projects. Turkey has expertly
played both sides against each other, making
it clear to the EU that Nabucco is not inevitable
but a choice. It can easily side with Russia, the
powerful hydrocarbon exporter, and still achieve
some of its strategic goals. In the end, how-
ever, Turkey must pick a side, or a very impor-
tant opportunity for the country will be squan-
dered. To determine which bidder will
ultimately win, one must examine what each
interested party is willing to trade for its prize.
The European Union offers a transparent mech-
anism for Turkey to generate hard currency,
an excellent diversification option for a country
with pressing energy security concerns, and
enhanced chances for membership in a club
Turkey has wanted to join for over a decade.
Russia, on the other hand, offers Turkey the
promise of big transit profits and gas volume,
all to be negotiated down the line, when Turkey
will no longer have the luxury of playing off buy-
ers against each other. In the current climate of
gas charged political conflict, Turkey’s choice is
a simple one. Nabucco will be built. It offers the
Turks an undeniable opportunity to make their
country of vital importance to the EU in addi-
tion to securing diversified gas supplies for
the development of the young, dynamic coun-
try. Strategic, tangible interests will trump illu-
sionary future gains, bringing together a buyer
and seller who have much to offer each other.
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3Turkey’s accession process was expected to be swift.
However, powerful members of the EU have shown their dis-
pleasure at the possibility of Turkish accession. Some
qualms are reasonable: substantial differences in wage
levels and unresolved issues over the contested island of
Cyprus. Others border on racism, claiming the Turks are
not European and thus cannot be part of the Union.
(“Turkey’s Circular Worries”) Turkey’s accession process has
been stagnant for some time.
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